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bastard was filius nullius, a child without rights. According to traditional thought, only the passage of the Elizabethan Poor Law in 1576,' when the burden of supporting illegitimate children from parish funds had grown too great for men to bear with equanimity, fastened an obligation to support on the father. That statute, moreover, never formed part of the common law received by American courts. A strictly penal measure, meant rather to preserve parish funds than to protect infants, it allegedly left intact the fundamental proposition that the bastard was filius nulliusA Initially, this proposition should arouse suspicion. The society that spawned the common law admitted no great disjunction between the teachings of morality and the dictates of law; and the duty to care for one's child, legitimate or not, was a part of the moral teaching of the time. This duty was enjoined on men by natural lawY The country that gave birth to the common law was also ruled by a succession of kings descended from an illegitimate sire." American courts and commentators should have been skeptical of the proposition that such a society cast no enforceable obligation on the parent to care for his newly born infant.
In fact, the proposition is mistaken. The illegitimate child had an enforceable support right prior to 1576. True, the common law itself did not provide an action against the father of a bastard child. But the obligation to support was enforced in the courts of the English Church. The common law's apparent neglect of the child indicates only the jurisdictional boundary between the courts of Church and State, not a disregard of the illegitimate child. 
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Proof of this assertion must rest in an examination of the canon law enforced in the English ecclesiastical courts. 1 ' This territory is unfamiliar for the legal historian as well as the lawyer. It calls for an investigation of proceedings not treated by most texts. But the development of the common law rules regulating domestic relations cannot be understood without it. Justice in England was not a unitary matter. Merchant courts, borough courts, and ecclesiastical courts all exercised jurisdiction over matters not covered, or only partially covered, by the royal courts. Whatever conflicts might have arisen among the various courts, all men assumed that each tribunal would carry out part of the total task of regulating men's behavior. Marriage, probate, and defamation, for example, all belonged to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. 2 No one disputed this allocation. As this article will show, enforcement of a father's duty to support his illegitimate child also fell within the purview of the canon law. Only in this restricted sense did the common law deny the illegitimate child the support of his father.
I. THE CANON LAW
The law of the Western Church required the father to support his child, even if the child were born out of wedlock. The duty is a notable example of the twin influences of humanity and Christianity on the law. Classical Roman law had imposed no obligation on the father; the regime of patria potestas allowed him the power of life and death over any of his offspring. 3 Imperial legislation softened this regime by requiring the father to support children born of legitimate marriage or of the recognized Roman form of 11 In medieval England, every bishop and every ecclesiastical dignitary kept a regular court of law, in which his officials administered the canon law. These courts had jurisdiction over both clergy and laity, they met approximately every three weeks in regular session, and the main courts were staffed by professionally trained lawyers and judges. There were, in other words, few places in England without contact with the legal system of the Church. For a good description of the courts of one English diocese, see B. VOOD-COCK, MEDIEVAL ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF CANTERBURY (1952 
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[sustenance] is denied for want of marriage, or when the Church fills a gap in the secular forum." ' For him, like most canonists, the principles of equity and benevolence supplied sufficient reason to justify the canon law's deviation from the harsh Roman law rule. 2 The divergence between the two forms of law, on the other hand, did not prevent the canonists from using the Roman law to justify and define the nature of the support obligation. They cited texts from the Institutes, Code, and Digest, virtually the whole of the Roman law, to show that natural law imposed a duty on all parents to nurture and support their children. They also borrowed the standards for determining the amount of support, for fixing the duration of the obligation, and for settling the means of proving paternity from the civil law. They saw no incongruity in using Roman law texts to shape an obligation towards illegitimate children, an obligation that Roman law itself denied. 2 This habit was not peculiar to paternity proceedings. It is found throughout medieval canon law. 2 ' This canonical borrowing, however, does highlight the often overlooked influence of the civil law upon English family law. Roman law, enforced first in the Church courts, later in the royal courts, helped to define the reach of the obligation to support.
The obligation to support adopted by the medieval canonists was a more extensive obligation than English or American law was to enforce subsequently. The duty was, in the first place, a 
").
21 A clear example of this use of Roman law is the medieval glossa ordinaria at X 4.7.5 s.v. secundum facultates. Three principles are laid down: 1) that the support should be given according to the resources available, 2) that the child should be sustained with the mother before the age of three, after that with the father, and 3) that the obligation was reciprocal. The gloss supports all three points with citations from Roman law, principally from sections of DIGFSr 25. 
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Virginia Law Review [Vol. 63:431 reciprocal one. Parents must support their children. Children must also support their parents. 2 3 Need and ability were the determinants. The duty also extended beyond parent and child. Grandparents, even aunts and uncles, could be required to support a child if the primary sources of support, the natural parents, were too poor. 4 The rights and duties of members of a family went a good deal further than they do today. The father's duty to nourish his illegitimate child was only one part of a much broader obligation.
II. THE ECCLESIASTICAL REMEDY
So much, of course, is only theory. The English Church courts did not put into practice every part of the medieval canon law. 5 If the duty of support were one of the parts they omitted, then the common law really did ignore the plight of the illegitimate child. Evidence of the conformity of English practice with medieval canon law must come from the contemporary Church court records. 6 Those records, unfortunately, are not easy to use or to 23 See, e.g., HoSTIENSIs, LEcTuPA at X 4.7.5, nos. 7-9. 24 See BARTOLUS 26 These records, which are today kept in county and diocesan archives throughout England, are the basis of this article. The majority of the records which once existed has been lost over the course of the centuries, but the author has examined most of the surviving medieval-and a large sample of the remaining 16th century records. Citation to these sources is given hereinafter by diocese. Those Filius Nullius interpret. 7 They survive in limited quantities, and the scribal habits of recording in the Act books often conceal more about the details of litigation than they reveal. Nevertheless, the available evidence is clear enough to show that the courts did enforce the obligation to support illegitimate children. The Act books demonstrate that the duty was not mere canonical theory. Litigated cases imposing support obligations came before the Church courts in two ways: petitions by the mother on behalf of the child, -8 and prosecutions ex officio for fornication or adultery resulting in the birth of a child. 29 Either type of dispute could give rise to a support order entered against the putative father. A case heard in the diocese of York in 1371 furnishes a good example of a petition brought by an unwed mother. Emmota Ripon appeared before the official (the principal judge in the court) together with William of Hexham. She "humbly asked that the same William of Hexham be condemned, compelled, and coerced to contribute to the support" of the child she alleged he had fathered.3 0 William disputed paternity. He "replied and said that he did not know whether the child was his or not." 31 He admitted sexual relations 27 Act books were the official records of procedure taken in the ecclesiastical courts during each court session or consistory. In them, the court scribe recorded the names of the parties, the subject matter, the action taken (e.g., the introduction of documents, the production of witnesses, or the delivery of sentence), and the terms assigned for the next hearing. They were unlike modern judicial opinions, in other words, in that they were normally confined to procedure. They were intended principally for future reference for internal court purposes. Fuller explanation of the nature of the court records can be found in D. OWEN 
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437 with her. But he suspected that someone else equally might be the father, "because he had been overseas and in other remote parts for a long time." 32 Like many such cases, this one came before the court only because the parties could not agree on the fundamental question of paternity. Emmota, however, swore a formal oath that William was the father. Having heard this, the official condemned William to pay two shillings for arrearages and to pay two pence weekly in the future toward child support. This was an interim order. The law required support to be paid until the question of paternity could be determined. 3 3 William was given an opportunity to prove that someone else was the father. The Act book, however, contains no further entry on the case. William may have acquiesced in the temporary order, or he may have settled the quarrel out of court. In either case, the court had acted to protect the child. It enforced the obligation of the putative father.
Ex officio prosecutions for sexual offenses provided the second forum for support orders in favor of illegitimate children. The statistical incidence of detection and prosecution of fornication and adultery in medieval England is unknowable, but pregnancies of unwed women must have brought to light many such affairs. When they did, the Church courts routinely required the father to support the child. For example, at Canterbury in 1465, Walter Tyler was prosecuted ex officio for fornication with Agnes Elys. He confessed. The court ordered him to undergo public penance, to provide a dowry for Agnes, 34 and to "cause the child to be nourished." The Act book gives no details about what may have been a very complicated family matter. The possibility of marriage between Agnes and Walter is not mentioned; nor are the attitudes 
Filius Nullius 439 of their parents, if they had living parents. The judge made no monetary award, perhaps leaving it to negotiation between the parties and their families. Clearly, however, the Church courts did not ignore the child. They routinely imposed the burden of support on the putative father. When the woman was pregnant at the time of the prosecution, the order specified that the obligation would attach "when the time comes." "G A search that has been by no means exhaustive has produced examples of support orders for illegitimate children from the ecclesiastical courts of Canterbury, 37 Chichester, 3 Lichfield, 39 Lincoln, 40 London, 4 ' Norwich, 42 Rochester, 43 St. Albans, 44 and York. 45 This list includes virtually all dioceses where any medieval records remain. 46 The support obligation evidently was enforced throughout England. Whoever initiated proceedings, paternity had to be established to warrant a support order; and paternity always has presented hard problems of proof. The medieval commentators recognized that proof of paternity was "difficult and almost impossible." 47 Following the outlines of Roman law, they therefore adopted a two step procedure weighted slightly in favor of the child. The first step was to be handled summarily. 8 and the woman named the man as the father, he was required to support the child until full hearing and determination of the claim of paternity. The courts were to accept no defendant's protest or evidence of access by other men. 49 Theoretically, this initial order did not prejudice the second, full hearing on the questionY The order was intended to guarantee support for the infant once the woman had made a presumptive case.
In the second hearing, the medieval commentators called for further proof. But even at that hearing, in the nature of things, proof of paternity could never reach a high level of accuracy. As a result the jurists were prepared to sanction "proof by presumptions and conjectures." 51 They listed the facts tending to prove filiation. Of these, sexual relations, or at least the continued opportunity for sexual relations, naturally was the most compelling. Other factors to be considered were the common fame of the community, prior admissions against interest by the father, and care for the child as one's own, even if not coupled with a claim of paternity. 5 2 Antonius de Butrio concluded that "whenever treatment [as one's child] is coupled with the opinion and fame of the neighbors, this without doubt proves and concludes filiation." 53 But most jurists left much to the discretion of the judge. They were content to enumerate the factors he should consider. They never accepted what has become the American rule that proof of paternity must be "clear, convincing, and satisfactory." 54 The scarcity and brevity of the remaining records make it impossible to determine with assurance how closely the English Church courts followed the elaborations of the jurists. What evidence there is suggests general congruence with medieval theory, with a greater use of compurgation than the medieval treatises 49 DIGEST 25.3.1.14; 37.9.1.14; CYNUs DE PISTOIA, COMMENTARIA at CODE 5.25.4, no. 4 (1578).
50 DIGEST 1.6.10; 25.3.5.9; BARTOLUS, supra note 48. 
Filius Nullius
would lead one to expect. Some Church courts clearly observed the division between the initial hearing for support purposes and the later full determination of paternity. They acted summarily in the initial hearing. 5 At Rochester in 1456, for example, Richard Bromlegh was prosecuted for fornication with Agnes Malemete, who had given birth to a child. He admitted fornication; he denied paternity. "And as for the procreation of the child, he said that the woman was defamed with other persons, and therefore he doubts the fathering." ," The judge, noting this plea, nevertheless made a summary order. Bromlegh "was warned to pay two pence weekly for support of the child until it should be established [that there was] another father." '7 Such summary disposition was the pattern. The exceptio plurium concubentium, denying support where other men have had sexual relations with the mother, was not an absolute bar to support, as many American courts were subsequently to hold."' In some cases the woman was obliged to find compurgators, that is, neighbors who would swear they believed her oath, to support her claim. 9 But if she did, the court made the initial support order envisioned by Roman law and adopted by the medieval commentators. About the second, full determination of paternity less can be said. Virtually all the evidence comes from the initial hearings. Only one case, a filiation proceeding from Lichfield in 1529, has survived to show that evidence of common fame and the man's treatment of the child as his own was introduced. 60 An initial 55 The cases almost invariably reach a conclusion in one or at the most two court sessions; e.g., Canterbury Act book X.8.3, f. 14r (1463), the record of a case in which the man was ordered to appear on July 4. He did not appear on that day but did appear on July 27, when a support order was entered against him. 60 Lichfield Act book B/C/2/3, f. 57r (1529), in which a master of a girl living in his house was said to have fathered her child. One of the questions put to the witnesses was whether the master had ever "caused the boy to be supported." There is also some evidence as to proof of filiation in CHILD-MIARRIAGES, DIvoRcES AND RATFICATIONS, ETC.
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hearing, followed by a realistic assessment of the situation and a compromise in light of that assessment, may have been all that was necessary in most cases. Much negotiation and discussion must have lain behind the bare notations of the Act books. The canon law permitted compromise of questions involving support, and the evidence suggests that judges and litigants took advantage of the permission.'I Judges, in fact, allowed settlement of suits over child support often enough to imply that they actively promoted settlement, at least settlement under their broad supervision. Similarly, little can be discovered about the size and duration of the support order. But indefiniteness was the natural result of the law. So closely linked was the order to the needs of the child and to the ability of the father to pay, so hesitant was the law to set any minimum limit to the obligation, that few fixed rules could be enforced in practice. 6 3 The canonist Joannes Andreae (d. 1348), for example, noted only that the father must support the child according to his means, and that the obligation ceased when the child had means to support himself.
6 4 There was no fixed table of awards. What gloss civilians and canonists gave to the subject concerned the general types of expenses that the obligation encompassed. It included food, shelter, and clothing. But it did not include payment of the child's debts. 65 Whether it covered payment for medicine was open to academic controversy, the predominant Filius Nullius opinion apparently being that it did. 6 6 Baldus de Ubaldis (d. 1400) gave the broadest meaning to the obligation. "Let the term alimenta be [taken] liberally for all things necessary to life." 67 Given this discretionary standard, the judges must have varied the size of their support orders to take account of individual circumstances, although in practice they rarely made large awards. The Act books do not suggest generosity. The amount of support varied from one penny per week (Rochester, 1347) 68 to six pence (York, 1374).60 Two pence per week is the sum mentioned most often in the remaining records, and this amount even into the early sixteenth century.
0 Most entries, however, specified no exact amount at all. The order of the court, and the undertaking of the father, was simply to provide the child's sustenance.
The duration of the obligation also varied. The court records describe orders lasting until the child reached the age of three 71 and the age of seven, 7 2 but these may have been meant as interim orders subject to revision. Typically the entry required support "until [the child] should come to legitimate age." 3 A few cases may have adopted the civilian rule that a child was to be nourished by the mother until age three, by the father afterwards, 4 but the number does not establish a clear rule of practice. What the records do suggest is the exercise of judicial discretion and the use of 66 G. DURANTIS If the available records are representative, inability to pay was the only defense offered by fathers once the question of paternity had been settled. Poverty was, of course, a possible plea under the law. In 1374 a Canterbury judge accepted such a defense, presumably after determining its truth. He nevertheless ordered the father to take up the obligation again "when he should come to more plentiful fortune." 75 One case, heard at Rochester in 1463, illustrates a court's readiness to provide support. Geoffrey Steyn was convicted of fathering the illegitimate child of Agnes Jays. He pleaded insufficiency of assets. "He had nothing in goods except by the grace and will of his father." 76 The court accepted this plea, but the judge "asked and induced Henry Steyn the father [of Geoffrey] to provide for the care of the aforesaid child" until better arrangements could be made."
Seven years before the case involving Steyn, the Rochester court had dealt with a similar situation. Apparently the father could not pay; neither could the mother. But Joan Marot, the sister of the mother, and her husband were "willing to take the entire burden of maintenance upon themselves and to support the child from their own resources." 78 The court approved the arrangement. Such entries reflect the only theme running consistently through the cases: the concern that someone, and someone related to the child, take up the obligation to support. Normally, responsi-75 Act book Y.1.1, f. 83r (1374). A slightly later causa alimentationis prolis from Canterbury, recorded in Deposition book X.10.1, f. 33r (1413), includes a witness's description of the defendant: "Habet ad sustentacionem suam vix valorem duarum marcarum annuatim de bonis propriis; habuit tamen ad medium annum hinc elapsum et ea alienavit matri sue." ("Out of his own goods he has barely two marks a year for his sustenance; however he had [goods] half a year ago and he alienated them to his mother."). Filius Nullius bility fell on the father. But if the father could not offer support, someone else should be found. This regime is the very opposite of the notion, so often said to have characterized medieval England, that the illegitimate child was filius nullius.
Identifying a person obliged to support a child, of course, was not always the end of the matter. Modern practice abundantly shows the difficulty of enforcing a continuing obligation that has no possibility of return. 9 The problem is not new. Many of the Act book entries involve claims for arrearages, fathers who had "fallen behind" in their payments. Perhaps encouraged by the canon law rule that relative need had a legitimate place in determining the scope of the obligation, the fathers had not met this obligation for long enough to bring the mother to the point of suing. 0 Suits occurred often enough to suggest that enforcement of support orders was a continuing problem.
The principal sanction available to the Church courts to secure enforcement was excommunication. In medieval society that spiritual penalty entailed a considerable loss of civil and religious rights. 81 Excommunication might even eventually result in a defaulting party's imprisonment. 2 But in assessing the nature of the enforcement in the Church courts, one should note that the judges did not rely on the threat of penal sanction alone. When a hearing was adjourned for attempts at arbitration and agreement, the ecclesiastical officials tried, whenever they could, to induce the defendant to agree voluntarily to pay support at a level acceptable to both himself and to the court. 83 Defendants often took solemn Virginia Law Review oaths to fulfill the obligation, a practice indicating that the Church court judges wanted the obligation undertaken as willingly as possible. 84 Support of one's child was an essentially moral duty. Acknowledgement of the duty and agreement, even reluctant agreement, to fulfill it played a regular part in Church court procedure. The judges used both conciliation and penal sanction to enforce support orders for illegitimate children. That the combination did not always ensure continued payment is testimony to a stubborn and familiar fact of human nature.
III. CONCLUSION
The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1576 empowered Justices of the Peace to compel parents to provide for the sustenance of their illegitimate children. Reciting the burden to parish funds caused by illegitimates, the Statute allowed the Justices to require payment for child support "in such wise as they shall think meet and convenient." 85 The Statute traditionally has been treated as if it created a new duty. 8 6 That treatment is clearly incorrect. The Statute simply provided a new mechanism for enforcing a duty previously enforced only in the courts of the Church. The enforcement mechanism adopted by the secular courts did include some new features, suretyship guarantees to insure payment, for example. But much of the Statute merely provided for continuation in a new forum of earlier practice. The summary determinations of paternity and the immediate support orders, for instance, followed ecclesiastical procedure closely. The Statute, therefore, should be seen principally as part of the great movement of religious and social change in sixteenth century
